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Abstract
We consider the dynamic trading strategies that minimize the expected cost of trading a
large block of securities over a ￿xed ￿nite number of periods. We obtain the result in which the
institutional investor sells more stocks in early stages when we introduce the conjectures about
the others￿actions o⁄ the equilibrium path that is identical to the ones on the equilibrium
path, compared to the outcome in the normal setting.
1 Introduction
Big institutional investors frequently have to sell/buy ￿xed amounts of securities until a certain
date. Recently how to trade in such an execution problem has been attracting academic attentions.
While many studies exogenously ￿x the behaviors of small traders, Ishii[17] explicitly modeled it,
in addition to the institutional investor in a general equilibrium model.
The former studies give ￿price impact functions￿as reduced form of behavior of small traders.
That is, they specify, exogenously, how the price changes according to the order of the institutional
investor. Most of the studies (for example, see Bertsimas and Lo [4]) show that the institutional
investor executes the same number of securities in each period over the entire time span in this
framework.
In contrast, Ishii [17] concludes that the price impact endogenously derived from the behavior
of small investors is more complicated than the ones in the former. The orders placed by the
institutional investor may be concentrated on the ￿nal period over a wide range of parameters
in Ishii￿ s [17] model. However, the trade concentration on the ￿nal period is not supported by
empirical analyses. How can we obtain the outcome in which early trades are active within the
framework of Ishii [17]?
This could be due to the assumption that the market participants expect others￿actions in
all information sets and update their beliefs rationally, which does not make much sense in the
actual market. Rather, it is felt that actual market participants behave on the premise of less
complex price impacts. Some practitioners insist that it is enough to adopt the impact function
in Almgren and Criss [1]. The present situation may be that the market participants expect
the others￿strategies simply, despite the complex strategies in reality. So, in that case, it could
be natural that market participants make decisions only due to the book in the past in similar
circumstances.
The relationship between Ishii￿ s [17] model and our model is reminiscent of the relationship
between strong-form and semi-strong form in the context of information e¢ ciency. If the price
re￿ ects all publicly and private information then the price is strong-form e¢ cient. If it correctly
re￿ ects only public information then it is only semi-strong-form e¢ cient. Ishii￿ s [17] model analyzes
the situation where the market participants rationally expect others￿strategies, and in our model
they only take into account the past price ￿ ows observable publicly.
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1Let us think in perspective of the extensive-form game. Ishii [17] considers the normal sequential
equilibrium. On the other hand, we assume the inconsistency between the beliefs and actions of
the market participants. It is come across occasionally in the context of evolution of extensive-form
game that the players construct some kinds of conjectures on the unobservable others￿actions and
choose best-responses against the conjectures. (See, for example, N￿ldeke and Samuelson [13]). On
the pattern of it, we assume that the market participants make their conjecture o⁄the equilibrium
path identi￿ed as the actions on the equilibrium path.
We show that the institutional investor sells more stocks in early stages in the stable state in
the evolutionary dynamic than the equilibrium in the normal setting similar to Ishii [17].
2 Model
There are one institutional investor (which we denote by II in what follows) and many small
investors (SI). They can trade at periods t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T. II has to sell W units of security over
this time period. Trades occur at t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T, and those who have one unit of securities obtain
dividends FT+1 at t = T + 1.
Ft = F0 +
t X
u=1
"Fu: (t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T + 1);
where F0 is observed by all traders at t = 0. Ft is the consitional expectation of the ￿nal dividends
at the period t, and follows a random walk. That is, each "Ft (t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T) in the trading
hours follows a normal distribution that has a mean 0 and a variance ￿2
F at the beginning of the
period t independently of each other. All traders observe "Ft and therefore Ft at the beginning of
t, and observe "FT+1 after the trading hours.The variances during market hours are the same as
one another.
II places a market order St at t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T. We require
PT
t=1 St = W. II is risk-neutral, and




where Pt is the security price at t.
There are in￿nitely many SIs whose population is 1. The measure of each SI is assumed to be
zero. These are of two types; irrational one (population ￿) and rational one (population 1 ￿ ￿).
SIs have no position at t = 0. They can borrow some money or securities and place limit orders at
t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T. They face no liquidity constraint. The interest rate is 0 for simplicity. We denote
the quantity held by a representative irrational (resp. rational) SI1 at the end of t as Bir
t (Br
t),























The subscript t means the conditional distribution on the information avairable until the time t.












1When all SIs place the identical orders, the aggregate SIs￿order is the same as in the case where one trader
with the risk aversion ￿ places his order. So we can call this virtual tarder a ￿representative SI.￿
2The price Pt is determined to balance buy and sell orders at every t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T:
St = ￿￿Bir
t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿Br
t: (1)
We make a mild assumption for the following analysis. The ex ante risk of the fundamentals is








Before considering the evolutionary decision making, we will derive a ￿one-shot￿equilibrum in the
benchmark model, where all market participants take into account the opponents￿strategies.
3.1 Decision Making of SIs
First, we consider SIs￿problem. They behave given the price ￿ ow, so that we can take the the ￿rst
order conditions in one lump without considering the order of the induction steps.
We consider a linear equilibrium in the followings. Since a linear combination of variables
that follow normal distributions also follows a normal distribution, the price Pt follows a normal
distribution. In addition, all observations follow normal distributions, so that we can take it for
granted that price Pt follows normal distributions conditional on the events by the beginning of t
for all traders.
We consider the equilibrium in which ￿Br
t and ￿Bir
t depend only on Ft ￿Pt (not on the indi-
vidual realizations Ft or Pt), and Ft￿Pt is measurable at the period 0. The conditional expectation






























The ￿rst order condition of the representative irrational SI is
￿￿
 
























t (￿) is the SI￿ s holding at the end of the period t as a function of Pt. Bir
t (Pt) (and the
realized holding Bir
t ) are measurable in terms of the information he has at the beginning of the
period t. We obtain the ￿rst order condition of the representative rational SI in a similar manner:
Br
t (Pt) =


























2It is inconceivable that the company is liquidated without new information after the cuto⁄ time. In this sense,
the assumption that ￿2
FT+1 is large enough seems natural.
33.2 Decision Making of II
We are supposed to solve the II￿ s optimization problem by the backward induction. However such
a solving method will make it di¢ cult to derive the outcome analytically. So we focus on a linear
equilibrium, replacing the problem with the one that ￿Before trading, II optimally determines the
discrepancies between the actual prices and the fundamentals.￿3 Speci￿cally, we de￿ne
FPt = Ft ￿ Pt (t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T);
and consider the model where II set FPt in an appropriate manner before trading hours. If we
were to view Ft and Pt as separate variables, the outcome would be the same as the case where
FPt were a uni￿ed variable. Thus, the de￿nition of FPt does not a⁄ect the solution of this model.









St = W and (5). (6)













































for t = 2;3;￿￿￿ ;T:
By the ￿rst order condition, we obtain the following.





















































FPt is a nondecreasing function with respect to t. In addition to this, (7) and (8) tell us
the increasing tendencies of the selling amounts of the security and the discrepancies between the
actual prices and the fundamentals over time. The irrational SIs buy the securities by a little
amount in early periods. The rational SIs sell by a little amount to the period before the last
period, but buy buck at a lower price at the last period, and their ￿nal positions are long. We see
these with the simple calculations here. Eliminating At from the above equations, we obtain


















3If we were to solve this problem by the backward induction, we would obtain the same linear equilibrium. The
author has ￿nished analyses of simple models already. Anyone who wants to know further particulars can e-mail
the author.
4Note that


















) FPt+2 ￿ FPt+1 ￿ FPt+1 ￿ FPt:




which means that the irrational SIs￿orders are increasing over time. It also means






Thus, the rational SIs sell at t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T ￿ 1 increasingly over time as II.
It may be di¢ cult to imagine the outcome. In the following sections, we see some distinctive
examples.
3.3 ￿ = 1, and ￿2
F = 0
All SIs are irrational and there is no ￿ uctuation of fundamentals before T. As in Bertsimas and





























where the market impact (the coe¢ cient that describes the price change in relation to the amount
of the II￿ s order) stays constant for all t:
￿￿2
FT+1:




has a permanent e⁄ect on the price. This can be interpreted as the inventory e⁄ect. SIs are risk-
averse, and the price should be low when they have long positions. As buyers of trading before
t, they already have large amounts of long positions. If II intends to sell more in this situation,
then SIs need lower price to take more risk. As a result, the price at t becomes low in proportion
to the cumulative amount of securities executed before t. Trade concentration work out to only a
disadvantage after such period. Instead II would like to divide the amounts into many parts, and
to sell o⁄ in pieces by little and little. II can sell the sesurities at a comparatively high price in
the early stage in this case. These kinds of motives lead to II￿ s evenly selling.
53.4 ￿ = 0, and ￿2
F 6= 0
All SIs are rational.4 We obtain the similar result as in Ishii [17]. II concentrates the trade on the
￿nal period.
S1 = S2 = ￿￿￿ = ST￿1 = 0, and
ST = W:
The discrepancies between the actual prices and the fundamentals are constant.
FPt = ￿￿2
FT+1W; for all t:
This result is attributed to the fact that the rational SIs are greedy. II has executed W until the
end of T, and the position of the representative SI at the end of the ￿nal period is also W. The
risk-averse SIs press to pay the fair share of the risk, and require the low price. The width of the
price reduction from the fundamental at T is
FPT = ￿￿2
FT+1W;
independently of S1;S2;￿￿￿ ;ST￿1. The trade does not take place at t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T ￿ 1 in the
equilibrium and SIs￿positions are 0. In order to maintain the level of 0 position, FPt has to be the
same as FPt+1. Therefore the low price level at the ￿nal period sustains over the trading time.
What happens if II sell a part of securities before the ￿nal period? Let II sell S1 > 0 at the
period 1 and ST = W ￿ S1 at T. Then, the positions of SIs are S1. Since SIs have long positions
at the period 1, they expect that the (expected) price at the period 2 is greater than the price at
1. That is,
FP2 ￿ FP1 = ￿￿2
FS1:
Furthermore SIs still continue to have the long positions S1, so that
FPt+1 ￿ FPt = ￿￿2
FS1;




Thus, even if II brings the execution forward, the price at the ￿nal period does not change, he
sells S1 at a bargain price, and the expected revenue becomes small. This can be interpreted as
the ￿inventory￿e⁄ect in a way apart from the above example.
3.5 T = 2
There is the composite population of the irrational and the rational SIs. We consider the 2 period












































4The assumption that the fundamentals change in some small measure during the trading period does not have
an essential role. We can conduce to the similar outcome in the case of ￿2
F = 0. If we assume ￿2
F = 0, however, II￿ s






















The price at the period 2 is undervalued than the price at 1. Because of the assumption (2), this
undervaluation FP2 ￿ FP1 is increasing with respect to ￿. The irrational SIs buy at the period
1, and buy at 2 because the price goes down further. The rational SIs have the same position at
the end of the period 2, but sell at 1. They see a pro￿t to buy back at the period 2 at a lower
price. The irrational SIs work as the buy basis of the selling by II, so that the higher price P1
than P2 can be realized. However P1 is depressed through the rational SIs￿arbitrage. FP2 remains
independent of the behavior of II. The way of execution has a tendency of bundle sale on the ￿nal
period. For every set of parameters,
S1 ￿ S2;
holds.
4 Evolutionary Decision Making
In the above section, II rationally expects the actions of SIs and takes into consideration the
opponents￿strategies. We see the situation where all market participants play the T + 1 period
trading again and again, and respond optimally from the myopic viewpoints in a sense to be
shown later. Let us call the one play of the T +1 period trading a round. The orders in the initial
round are arbitrarily ￿xed. Every market participant places his order as one of best responses to
realization in the last round. If there are multiple best responses, they choose one randomly with
full support.5 SIs observe the price ￿ ow (FPt)
T
t=1 in every round, and place their orders supposing
that the price ￿ ow in the present round is the same as (FPt)
T
t=1 in the last round. SIs￿orders at
the time t o⁄the equilibrium path (the possible order that SIs would place at the unrealized price)
are determined as the best responses to the same price ￿ ow as in the last round except the price at
the period t. SI￿ s limit orders at the period t are expressed as the function of FPt, and II observe
the sequence of the function.6 II best-responses to ￿Bir
t (Pt ￿ F0
t + Ft)+(1 ￿ ￿)Br
t (Pt ￿ F0
t + Ft)
when the fundamentals in the last round are (F0
t)
T




t (￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)Br
t (￿)
￿T
t=1. Any market participant does not modify his order plan in the
middle of a round play.7
We can think of this process as a Markov process. A vector that lines up the in￿nitely many
orders of II and SIs corresponds a state. When one state gets decided, (the probability distribution
of) the next state gets decided. We interpret the absorbing state in this Markov process as the
stable state in the evolutionary dynamic.
Theorem 2 We can express the discrepancies between the actual prices and the fundamentals as
a function of ST, and obtain the unique absorbing state analytically. (FPt)
T
t=1 are proportional to
￿, and (St)
T
t=1 are independent of ￿.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since the equations are complex and there is little intuition, so that it may be better to skip
the derivation of the explicit solution. In the following we see what happens in the evolutionary
dynamic using the same examples as the benchmark models.
5Generally we have more than one best responses, but we can obtain unique best response when the orders in
the last round can be thought of a pure action pro￿le.
6The book II can observe at each period t is only function of FPt. It does not depend on FPu (u 6= t) because
it can not re￿ect the price at other period than t.
7Imagine the situation where one can beforehand send his order to a securities company, but can not monitor
conditions of market during market hours (for example, with his business).
74.1 ￿ = 1, and ￿2
F = 0











(for t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T):
It would help the promotion of understanding to consider the following story. The initial state
is the equilibrium actions of the above benchmark model. That is, II sells evenly and the prices
ratchet down. Observing this outcome, II think about the order ￿ ow in the next round ￿I sold
evenly and the price decreased with time gradually. If it will be all the same in the next round, I
do not have to have large inventory till late. What would happen if I were to sell in earlier period
a part of securities that would be supposed to be sold at the ￿nal period. It is true that the price
in the earlier period would be depressed, but this loss can be made up for by the advance of the
price at the ￿nal period through the decrease in the selling amount. More importantly, the price
of the securities moved up the schedule for should become higher. I guess that the entire selling
plan is well organized.￿Realistically there are no rise in price at the ￿nal period because of the
inventory e⁄ect. II who believes that the order ￿ ow in the next round will be the same as the one
in the last round makes the selling period moved forward. SIs observe II￿ s selling moved forward,
and place the limit orders that comply with it. II￿ s next order complies with the SIs￿order that
he observe... By process like this it converges with the absorbing state above.
4.2 ￿ = 0, and ￿2
F = ￿2
FT+1
All SIs are rational. We assume here ￿2
F = ￿2
FT+1 for simplicity. II￿ s earlier selling achieves in the











































































































(for t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T):
Unlike the above example, the prices increase over time.
84.3 T = 2













































































S1 is increasing with ￿. We can not describe magnitude correlation between FP1 and FP2 categor-
ically. However FP1 is increasing with ￿, and if ￿ is greater than the threshold level, FP1 > FP2
holds. That is, the greater the proportion of the rational SIs is, the lower the price at the period
1, resulting in the buy orders of both irrational and rational SIs against II￿ s sell order.
5 Conclusion
We have considered a multiperiod model of securities trading in an evolutionary setting. We show
that earlier selling in the case of the evolutionary decision making indeed takes place, and the price
becomes lower.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Note that































































FPt+1 = 0 (t = 2;3;￿￿￿ ;T ￿ 1):






























































































































































































































6.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Let (St)
T









t=1 are only at the period t and u (t < u). We denote
S0
t = St + ￿, and S0































































































Su + FPu = ￿￿2
FT+1ST + FPT:





































































FT+1 (ST ￿ W);












































































































FT+1 (ST + W)



























We do the elementary transformation of the matrix with respect to rows in the left side of the
























































































3 < Bt ￿ 1
2 (t 6= 0) holds and Bt is decreasing with respect to t. Multiplying the tth row by Bt
























































































Bt and add it to the t￿1th row from bottom










































































(the t;j element of the matrix);
where 1 ￿ i;j ￿ T ￿ 1 holds and
￿j=T￿1 =
￿
1 if j = T ￿ 1
0 if j 6= T ￿ 1 ;
u￿1 Y
v=u
(equation of some sort) = 1; and
u￿1 Y
v=u0
(equation of some sort)ju0>u = 0:
St (t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T ￿ 1) can be represented as (FPt)
T
t=1, so that we obtain the prices and II￿ s
strategy in the absorbing state using the relational expressions
T X
t=1
St = W, and FPT = ￿￿2
FT+1W:
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